| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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When the circ-padding feature is enabled, we use maybenot, which does
not yet support rand 0.10. In the meantime, enabling this feature pulls
in rand 0.9. This is not ideal, but should be okay as a temporary
situation.
This also replaces the use of ReseedingRng (which was removed in 0.10)
with the reseeding_rng crate. This is somewhat less performant, but it
should be okay.
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This will be needed for ntor handshakes.
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This will be needed for ntor handshakes.
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This trickles down to the tor-proto channel handshake code. But, the
real need is in the channel builder in order to validate the outbound
channel target.
Fixes #2440
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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From opara's comment:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/merge_requests/3844#note_3388789
Keep the low level AuthLogDigest type alias and return it. The callsite
is the one deciding if the returned digest is a Clog or a Slog.
Related to #2441
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Introduce those types in order to avoid mixing them up as the previous
AuthLogDigest was just a type alias over [u8; 32]
Fixes #2441
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Instead of giving the `CreateRequestHandler` to the channel after it's
constructed, we integrate it into the handshake so that we can give it
to the channel constructor.
The `ChannelType` is no longer part of the `Channel`.
Some of the tests could be cleaned up slightly now that the channel
doesn't need the `ChannelType`, but I don't want to conflict with !3853.
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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This object contains a melting pot of public keys, private keys and
certificates.
Rename it to reflect that it is channel authentication material and not
"identities.
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/merge_requests/3791#note_3374454
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Mostly, identity a `ChanTarget` as a "target" since we juggle with
PeerInfo and OwnedChanTarget nowadays.
All certificate and keys have very specific names which attempts to
match the spec as much as possible.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Make read_msg() into a helper and use it accross the handshake code.
No behavior change.
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/merge_requests/3791#note_3374466
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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We can remove the "/* take_slog */ true" pattern and instead have an
explicit type at the callsite for semantic.
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/merge_requests/3791#note_3374457
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/merge_requests/3791#note_3374457
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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It used to work for an initiator to set the link protocol once a
VERSIONS is received because initiator send their VERSIONS before. This
failed with responders because a responder channel sends their VERSIONS
after receiving one from the initiator.
This reverse logic means that the channel cell handler was transitionned
to the Handshake state before a responder was able to send a VERSIONS
cell leading to a failure because VERSIONS cell aren't allowed at the
Handshake state.
To fix this, the send/recv or recv/send is now explicit per channel type
and once this is done and successful, the link protocol is set. A
`set_link_protocol()` is added to the ChannelBaseHandshake trait so it
can be used to set the cell handler.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Both client and relay specialized channel now use it as their inner base
channel so they can use the same common verify() function since it is
the same validation for both.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Remove the last part from check_internal() that is specific to an
initiator channel.
At this commit, all three specialized channel do the verify process
within their own verify() function.
The client and relay initiator both look at the TLS cert (code
duplication unfortunately). And the relay responder looks at the
LINK_AUTH cert extracting the peer KP_link_ed key for validation.
The CERTS cell is removed from UnverifiedChannel as it is now only
useful within the verification process which is now specialized.
A series of TODO(relay) is added to point out the current problem and
how to fix them.
The next step is to create an UnverifiedInitiatorChannel that will hold
the verity_tls_cert() function and peer cert information which is only
relevant to an initiator. This will remove code duplication.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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The responder always sends an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell.
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Only the R2R channel that the PeerAddr becomes unsensitive. The rest, we
keep it sensitive as it can be a client or a client's guard/bridge.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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It was all commented out until now that we have a final
RelayIdentities.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Responder relay handshake requires the peer address at the very start as
it sends its NETINFO right away.
For initiators, we only need it during the finalization process which is
when the NETINFO is sent and the Channel is created.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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This is a large change but it is basically using PeerAddr in the channel
builder through the channel handshake code and into the Channel itself.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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All handshake pass the NETINFO cell, the advertised addresses (if any)
and the peer address in order to build the Canonicity and build the
channel with it.
In order to pull this off, the "my_addrs" were added to several object
along the NETINFO cell.
We also pass the channel method when connecting (initiator) to a relay
as we need this for this canonicity build.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Add the unverified, verified, non verifiable flavor types of a responder
channel.
This follow on the previous commit to use the type system for stronger
guarantees.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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This commit adds the Unverified and Verified flavor of a relay channel
specific to an initiator.
We decided to use the type system for safety and avoid patterns like:
"if chan.is_initiator() {...} else {...}"
This allows us also to not duplicate code between initiator and
responder code.
The downside is that we expose these types outside of tor-proto meaning
the caller needs to feature gate the usage of these types with the
"relay" flag.
Small price to pay for strong guarantees with the type system.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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This commits returns either Some(AUTH_CELL, CERTS) or None. We future
proof ourselves against one Some and other None even if an error check
is done before.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Remove the channel type from Unverified and Verified channels and
instead use the channel type in the underlying channel codec.
The codec requires such type in order to restrict messages sets. Instead
of duplicating it, this commit simply makes it that there is now only a
single channel type attached to a channel structure.
The resulting `struct Channel` in the end gets it copied from the
channel codec as the framed_tls gets split and given to the `Reactor`.
Down the line, we need a channel type attached to the `Channel` in order
to know if it is a client or not and authenticated or not.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Instead, use the static AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 value which is
for now the only version we support.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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A Responder receiving cells from the Initiator, if it gets a CERTS, an
AUTHENTICATE must also be present (and vice-versa).
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Once channel is verified and authenticate if need be, send the NETINFO.
We require our advertised IP addresses for this so pass them to launch()
as well to the UnverifiedRelayChannel.
A cargo fmt change slipped in here, sorry about that.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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This commit is a bit loaded but it is coherent.
First, we set Eq and PartialEq to the channel message Authenticate so we
can compare it with the one we expected.
Second, the AuthenticationCell enum is introduced to store either an
AUTH_CHALLENGE or an AUTHENTICATE since one side of the handshake can
only have one. This allows us to store one or the other in
UnverifiedRelayChannel.
Depending on what we have, the authentication process is different as it
dictates which side we are on (initiator vs responder). Keep in mind
that the handshake code enforces receiving a AUTH_CHALLENGE along side
CERTS. And same goes for AUTHENTICATE which means that if we have an
AUTH_CHALLENGE in the UnverifiedRelayChannel, it is certain that the
other side wants to authenticate and we are the initiator.
Finally, the sending of CERTS and AUTHENTICATE by the initiator is now
in UnverifiedRelayChannel::check() done right after verifying the
channel CERTS and holding a "VerifiedChannel" object.
This means that the last piece, sending the `NETINFO` by the initiator
will be done in the check() but in a future commit. This leaves the
VerifiableChannel::finish() to send nothing and only finalize the
channel with the NETINFO (canonicity).
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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We need this trait for the underlying TLS stream in order to access data
such as the certificates or keying material.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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This commit introduces the RelayResponderHandshake object used when
accepting an inbound connection to open a channel.
There are still TODOs pepperred in the code but the base is implemented.
The Unverified and Verified channel need to be adjusted for this new
handshake.
This will come in the next commits.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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This requires to make a series of cert and digest also optionnable in
the VerifiedChannel.
This change is needed because as a relay responder, you might get the
CERTS or not depending on if the other side wants to authenticate.
Client and bridges do not authenticate and thus it is expected to not
have a CERTS cell.
This leads to the UnverifiedChannel::check() function to return early
with a VerifiedChannel without any identity attached to it.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Code movement only.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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They are public but avoid anyone outside implementing them.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Add traits that will be returned outside tor-proto allowing us to not
expose client and relay specific channels.
The goal is for the tor-chanmgr to get those objects implementing those
traits and can build and run the reactor without knowing the specific
underlying type.
This allows us to have less code duplication and less client/relay
distinction in the chanmgr.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
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