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Implements proposal 358.
Closes #1946.
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Previously it required the caller to import a whole bunch of stuff.
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We're going to use it for ntorv3 extensions as well.
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In this design, the thin multiplexing layer between PoW types is always
available when onion services are in use, but the specific pow schemes
(and their dependency libraries) are gated by crate features everywhere.
There are now no new cfg() gates.
When the pow-v1 scheme is disabled, we can parse `pow-params v1` lines
into an empty type (so clients know a PoW scheme exists that might be
supported if they were configured differently). We currently don't save
the contents of unknown hsdesc items.
On the relaycell side, the hs ext module already sets a strong precedent
for keeping unrecognized data as a byte vec, and it doesn't provide a
good way to signal soft parse errors like unrecognized optional
extensions. There, the `v1` type is completely optional, and services
lacking a pow scheme suggested by a client would see one of these
'unrecognized' blobs. This isn't necessarily helpful but it fits the
rest of the design.
Co-authored-by: Micah Elizabeth Scott <[email protected]>
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My previous strategy here was to try and centralize hspow in one crate,
writing it like a self-contained feature. That introduced friction in
the data types, prompting the use of simplistic types at the netdoc/cell
layers and full-featured types in the optional modules.
This changes tactics, dissolving the low-level parts of tor-hspow into
tor-hscrypto and the high-level parts into hsclient/hsservice. Full
featured types are used everywhere now, but the tradeoff is that
compile-time configurability is a lot more pervasive. Anything that
knows about PoW types at all needs to be fully configured out. I took
this opportunity to try a more complete set of crate features, allowing
users to configure individual PoW schemes.
Co-authored-by: Micah Elizabeth Scott <[email protected]>
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Like parameters, PoW solutions are versioned to account for multiple
algorithms over time. A single solution of a specific version may
accompany an INTRO1/2 as part of the encrypted extensions section. Its
encoding may depend on the version.
Co-authored-by: Micah Elizabeth Scott <[email protected]>
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Yes, we still will need more accessors for onion services, but we
can add them as we find the need.
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(This is the encrypted information inside the INTRODUCE2 cell; it's
used by the client to tell the service where to find its rendezvous
point.)
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