//! Implementations for the channel handshake use futures::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite}; use futures::sink::SinkExt; use futures::stream::StreamExt; use tor_cell::chancell::msg::AnyChanMsg; use tor_error::internal; use crate::channel::{ChannelFrame, ChannelType, UniqId}; use crate::memquota::ChannelAccount; use crate::util::skew::ClockSkew; use crate::{Error, Result}; use tor_cell::chancell::{AnyChanCell, ChanMsg, msg}; use tor_rtcompat::{CoarseTimeProvider, SleepProvider, StreamOps}; use std::sync::Arc; use std::time::SystemTime; use tor_linkspec::{ChanTarget, ChannelMethod, OwnedChanTargetBuilder, RelayIds}; use tor_llcrypto as ll; use tor_llcrypto::pk::ed25519::Ed25519Identity; use tor_llcrypto::pk::rsa::RsaIdentity; use digest::Digest; use tracing::{debug, instrument, trace}; /// A list of the link protocols that we support. pub(crate) static LINK_PROTOCOLS: &[u16] = &[4, 5]; /// Base trait that all handshake type must implement. /// /// It has common code that all handshake share including getters for the channel frame for cell /// decoding/encoding and the unique ID used for logging. /// /// It has both a recv() and send() function for the VERSIONS cell since every handshake must start /// with this cell to negotiate the link protocol version. pub(crate) trait ChannelBaseHandshake where T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + StreamOps + Send + Unpin + 'static, { /// Return a mutable reference to the channel frame. fn framed_tls(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelFrame; /// Return a reference to the unique ID of this handshake. fn unique_id(&self) -> &UniqId; /// Send a [msg::Versions] cell. /// /// A tuple is returned that is respectively the instant and wallclock of the send. async fn send_versions_cell( &mut self, now_fn: F, ) -> Result<(coarsetime::Instant, SystemTime)> where F: FnOnce() -> SystemTime, { trace!(stream_id = %self.unique_id(), "sending versions"); // Send versions cell let version_cell = AnyChanCell::new( None, msg::Versions::new(LINK_PROTOCOLS) .map_err(|e| Error::from_cell_enc(e, "versions message"))? .into(), ); self.framed_tls().send(version_cell).await?; Ok(( coarsetime::Instant::now(), // Flushed at instant now_fn(), // Flushed at wallclock )) } /// Receive a [msg::Versions] cell. /// /// The negotiated link protocol is returned, and also recorded in the underlying channel /// frame. This automatically transitions the frame into the "Handshake" state of the /// underlying cell handler. In other words, once the link protocol version is negotiated, the /// handler can encode and decode cells for that version in order to continue the handshake. async fn recv_versions_cell(&mut self) -> Result { // Get versions cell. // Get versions cell. trace!(stream_id = %self.unique_id(), "waiting for versions"); // This can be None if we've reached EOF or any type of I/O error on the underlying TCP or // TLS stream. Either case, it is unexpected. let Some(cell) = self.framed_tls().next().await.transpose()? else { return Err(Error::ChanIoErr(Arc::new(std::io::Error::from( std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof, )))); }; let AnyChanMsg::Versions(their_versions) = cell.into_circid_and_msg().1 else { return Err(Error::from(internal!( "Unexpected cell, expecting a VERSIONS cell", ))); }; trace!(stream_id = %self.unique_id(), "received their VERSIONS {:?}", their_versions); // Determine which link protocol we negotiated. let link_protocol = their_versions .best_shared_link_protocol(LINK_PROTOCOLS) .ok_or_else(|| Error::HandshakeProto("No shared link protocols".into()))?; trace!(stream_id = %self.unique_id(), "negotiated version {}", link_protocol); // Set the link protocol into our channel frame. self.framed_tls() .codec_mut() .set_link_version(link_protocol)?; Ok(link_protocol) } } /// Handshake initiator base trait. All initiator handshake should implement this trait in order to /// enjoy the helper functions. /// /// It requires the base handshake trait to be implement for access to the base getters. pub(crate) trait ChannelInitiatorHandshake: ChannelBaseHandshake where T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + StreamOps + Send + Unpin + 'static, { /// Return true iff this handshake is expecting to receive an AUTH_CHALLENGE from the /// responder. As a handshake initiator, we always know if we expect one or not. A client or /// bridge do not authenticate with the responder while relays will always do. fn is_expecting_auth_challenge(&self) -> bool; /// As an initiator, we are expecting the responder's cells which are (not in that order): /// - [msg::AuthChallenge], [msg::Certs], [msg::Netinfo] /// /// Any duplicate, missing cell or unexpected results in a protocol level error. /// /// This returns the [msg::AuthChallenge], [msg::Certs] and [msg::Netinfo] cells along the /// instant when the netinfo cell was received. This is needed for the clock skew calculation. async fn recv_cells_from_responder( &mut self, ) -> Result<( Option, msg::Certs, (msg::Netinfo, coarsetime::Instant), )> { let mut auth_challenge_cell: Option = None; let mut certs_cell: Option = None; let mut netinfo_cell: Option<(msg::Netinfo, coarsetime::Instant)> = None; // IMPORTANT: Protocol wise, we MUST only allow one single cell of each type for a valid // handshake. Any duplicates lead to a failure. They can arrive in any order unfortunately. // Read until we have the netinfo cell. while let Some(cell) = self.framed_tls().next().await.transpose()? { use super::AnyChanMsg::*; let (_, m) = cell.into_circid_and_msg(); trace!(stream_id = %self.unique_id(), "received a {} cell.", m.cmd()); match m { // Ignore the padding. Only VPADDING cell can be sent during handshaking. Vpadding(_) => (), // Clients don't care about AuthChallenge AuthChallenge(ac) => { if auth_challenge_cell.replace(ac).is_some() { return Err(Error::HandshakeProto( "Duplicate AUTH_CHALLENGE cell".into(), )); } } Certs(c) => { if certs_cell.replace(c).is_some() { return Err(Error::HandshakeProto("Duplicate CERTS cell".into())); } } Netinfo(n) => { if netinfo_cell.is_some() { // This should be impossible, since we would // exit this loop on the first netinfo cell. return Err(Error::from(internal!( "Somehow tried to record a duplicate NETINFO cell" ))); } netinfo_cell = Some((n, coarsetime::Instant::now())); break; } // This should not happen because the ChannelFrame makes sure that only allowed cell on // the channel are decoded. However, Rust wants us to consider all AnyChanMsg. _ => { return Err(Error::from(internal!( "Unexpected cell during initiator handshake: {m:?}" ))); } } } // Missing any of the above means we are not connected to a Relay and so we abort the // handshake protocol. let Some((netinfo, netinfo_rcvd_at)) = netinfo_cell else { return Err(Error::HandshakeProto("Missing NETINFO cell".into())); }; let Some(certs) = certs_cell else { return Err(Error::HandshakeProto("Missing CERTS cell".into())); }; // If we plan to authenticate, we require an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from the responder. if self.is_expecting_auth_challenge() && auth_challenge_cell.is_none() { return Err(Error::HandshakeProto("Missing AUTH_CHALLENGE cell".into())); }; Ok((auth_challenge_cell, certs, (netinfo, netinfo_rcvd_at))) } } /// A base channel on which versions have been negotiated and the relay's handshake has been read, /// but where the certs have not been checked. /// /// Both relay and client have specialized objects for an unverified channel which include this one /// as the base in order to share functionnalities. pub(crate) struct UnverifiedChannel< T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + StreamOps + Send + Unpin + 'static, S: CoarseTimeProvider + SleepProvider, > { /// Indicate what type of channel this is. pub(crate) channel_type: ChannelType, /// Runtime handle (insofar as we need it) pub(crate) sleep_prov: S, /// Memory quota account pub(crate) memquota: ChannelAccount, /// The negotiated link protocol. Must be a member of LINK_PROTOCOLS pub(crate) link_protocol: u16, /// The Source+Sink on which we're reading and writing cells. pub(crate) framed_tls: ChannelFrame, /// The certs cell that we got from the relay. pub(crate) certs_cell: msg::Certs, /// Declared target method for this channel, if any. pub(crate) target_method: Option, /// How much clock skew did we detect in this handshake? /// /// This value is _unauthenticated_, since we have not yet checked whether /// the keys in the handshake are the ones we expected. pub(crate) clock_skew: ClockSkew, /// Logging identifier for this stream. (Used for logging only.) pub(crate) unique_id: UniqId, } /// A base channel on which versions have been negotiated, relay's handshake has been read, but the /// client has not yet finished the handshake. /// /// This type is separate from UnverifiedChannel, since finishing the handshake requires a bunch of /// CPU, and you might want to do it as a separate task or after a yield. /// /// Both relay and client have specialized objects for an unverified channel which include this one /// as the base in order to share functionnalities. pub(crate) struct VerifiedChannel< T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + StreamOps + Send + Unpin + 'static, S: CoarseTimeProvider + SleepProvider, > { /// Indicate what type of channel this is. pub(crate) channel_type: ChannelType, /// Runtime handle (insofar as we need it) pub(crate) sleep_prov: S, /// Memory quota account pub(crate) memquota: ChannelAccount, /// The negotiated link protocol. pub(crate) link_protocol: u16, /// The Source+Sink on which we're reading and writing cells. pub(crate) framed_tls: ChannelFrame, /// Declared target method for this stream, if any. pub(crate) target_method: Option, /// Logging identifier for this stream. (Used for logging only.) pub(crate) unique_id: UniqId, /// Validated Ed25519 identity for this peer. pub(crate) ed25519_id: Ed25519Identity, /// Validated RSA identity for this peer. pub(crate) rsa_id: RsaIdentity, /// Peer verified RSA cert digest. pub(crate) rsa_cert_digest: [u8; 32], /// Peer TLS certificate digest pub(crate) peer_cert_digest: [u8; 32], /// Authenticated clock skew for this peer. pub(crate) clock_skew: ClockSkew, } impl< T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + StreamOps + Send + Unpin + 'static, S: CoarseTimeProvider + SleepProvider, > UnverifiedChannel { /// Validate the certificates and keys in the relay's handshake. /// /// 'peer' is the peer that we want to make sure we're connecting to. /// /// 'peer_cert' is the x.509 certificate that the peer presented during /// its TLS handshake (ServerHello). /// /// 'now' is the time at which to check that certificates are /// valid. `None` means to use the current time. It can be used /// for testing to override the current view of the time. /// /// This is a separate function because it's likely to be somewhat /// CPU-intensive. #[instrument(skip_all, level = "trace")] pub(crate) fn check( self, peer: &U, peer_cert: &[u8], now: Option, ) -> Result> { let peer_cert_sha256 = ll::d::Sha256::digest(peer_cert).into(); self.check_internal(peer, peer_cert_sha256, now) } /// Same as `check`, but takes the SHA256 hash of the peer certificate, /// since that is all we use. pub(crate) fn check_internal( self, peer: &U, peer_cert_digest: [u8; 32], now: Option, ) -> Result> { use tor_cert::CertType; use tor_checkable::*; /// Helper: given a time-bound input, give a result reflecting its /// validity at `now`, and the inner object. /// /// We use this here because we want to validate the whole handshake /// regardless of whether the certs are expired, so we can determine /// whether we got a plausible handshake with a skewed partner, or /// whether the handshake is definitely bad. fn check_timeliness(checkable: C, now: SystemTime, skew: ClockSkew) -> (Result<()>, T) where C: Timebound, { let status = checkable.is_valid_at(&now).map_err(|e| match (e, skew) { (TimeValidityError::Expired(expired_by), ClockSkew::Fast(skew)) if expired_by < skew => { Error::HandshakeCertsExpired { expired_by } } // As it so happens, we don't need to check for this case, since the certs in use // here only have an expiration time in them. // (TimeValidityError::NotYetValid(_), ClockSkew::Slow(_)) => todo!(), (_, _) => Error::HandshakeProto("Certificate expired or not yet valid".into()), }); let cert = checkable.dangerously_assume_timely(); (status, cert) } // Replace 'now' with the real time to use. let now = now.unwrap_or_else(SystemTime::now); // We need to check the following lines of authentication: // // First, to bind the ed identity to the channel. // peer.ed_identity() matches the key in... // IDENTITY_V_SIGNING cert, which signs... // SIGNING_V_TLS_CERT cert, which signs peer_cert. // // Second, to bind the rsa identity to the ed identity: // peer.rsa_identity() matches the key in... // the x.509 RSA identity certificate (type 2), which signs... // the RSA->Ed25519 crosscert (type 7), which signs... // peer.ed_identity(). let c = &self.certs_cell; /// Helper: get a cert from a Certs cell, and convert errors appropriately. fn get_cert( certs: &tor_cell::chancell::msg::Certs, tp: CertType, ) -> Result { match certs.parse_ed_cert(tp) { Ok(c) => Ok(c), Err(tor_cell::Error::ChanProto(e)) => Err(Error::HandshakeProto(e)), Err(e) => Err(Error::HandshakeProto(e.to_string())), } } let id_sk = get_cert(c, CertType::IDENTITY_V_SIGNING)?; let sk_tls = get_cert(c, CertType::SIGNING_V_TLS_CERT)?; let mut sigs = Vec::new(); // Part 1: validate ed25519 stuff. // // (We are performing our timeliness checks now, but not inspecting them // until later in the function, so that we can distinguish failures that // might be caused by clock skew from failures that are definitely not // clock skew.) // Check the identity->signing cert let (id_sk, id_sk_sig) = id_sk .should_have_signing_key() .map_err(Error::HandshakeCertErr)? .dangerously_split() .map_err(Error::HandshakeCertErr)?; sigs.push(&id_sk_sig); let (id_sk_timeliness, id_sk) = check_timeliness(id_sk, now, self.clock_skew); // Take the identity key from the identity->signing cert let identity_key = id_sk.signing_key().ok_or_else(|| { Error::HandshakeProto("Missing identity key in identity->signing cert".into()) })?; // Take the signing key from the identity->signing cert let signing_key = id_sk.subject_key().as_ed25519().ok_or_else(|| { Error::HandshakeProto("Bad key type in identity->signing cert".into()) })?; // Now look at the signing->TLS cert and check it against the // peer certificate. let (sk_tls, sk_tls_sig) = sk_tls .should_be_signed_with(signing_key) .map_err(Error::HandshakeCertErr)? .dangerously_split() .map_err(Error::HandshakeCertErr)?; sigs.push(&sk_tls_sig); let (sk_tls_timeliness, sk_tls) = check_timeliness(sk_tls, now, self.clock_skew); if peer_cert_digest != sk_tls.subject_key().as_bytes() { return Err(Error::HandshakeProto( "Peer cert did not authenticate TLS cert".into(), )); } // Batch-verify the ed25519 certificates in this handshake. // // In theory we could build a list of _all_ the certificates here // and call pk::validate_all_sigs() instead, but that doesn't gain // any performance. if !ll::pk::ed25519::validate_batch(&sigs[..]) { return Err(Error::HandshakeProto( "Invalid ed25519 signature in handshake".into(), )); } // Part 2: validate rsa stuff. // What is the RSA identity key, according to the X.509 certificate // in which it is self-signed? // // (We don't actually check this self-signed certificate, and we use // a kludge to extract the RSA key) let pkrsa = c .cert_body(CertType::RSA_ID_X509) .and_then(ll::util::x509_extract_rsa_subject_kludge) .ok_or_else(|| Error::HandshakeProto("Couldn't find RSA identity key".into()))?; // Now verify the RSA identity -> Ed Identity crosscert. // // This proves that the RSA key vouches for the Ed key. Note that // the Ed key does not vouch for the RSA key: The RSA key is too // weak. let rsa_cert = c .cert_body(CertType::RSA_ID_V_IDENTITY) .ok_or_else(|| Error::HandshakeProto("No RSA->Ed crosscert".into()))?; let rsa_cert = tor_cert::rsa::RsaCrosscert::decode(rsa_cert) .map_err(|e| Error::from_bytes_err(e, "RSA identity cross-certificate"))? .check_signature(&pkrsa) .map_err(|_| Error::HandshakeProto("Bad RSA->Ed crosscert signature".into()))?; let (rsa_cert_timeliness, rsa_cert) = check_timeliness(rsa_cert, now, self.clock_skew); if !rsa_cert.subject_key_matches(identity_key) { return Err(Error::HandshakeProto( "RSA->Ed crosscert certifies incorrect key".into(), )); } let rsa_id = pkrsa.to_rsa_identity(); trace!( stream_id = %self.unique_id, "Validated identity as {} [{}]", identity_key, rsa_id ); // Now that we've done all the verification steps on the // certificates, we know who we are talking to. It's time to // make sure that the peer we are talking to is the peer we // actually wanted. // // We do this _last_, since "this is the wrong peer" is // usually a different situation than "this peer couldn't even // identify itself right." let actual_identity = RelayIds::builder() .ed_identity(*identity_key) .rsa_identity(rsa_id) .build() .expect("Unable to build RelayIds"); // We enforce that the relay proved that it has every ID that we wanted: // it may also have additional IDs that we didn't ask for. match super::check_id_match_helper(&actual_identity, peer) { Err(Error::ChanMismatch(msg)) => Err(Error::HandshakeProto(msg)), other => other, }?; // If we reach this point, the clock skew might be may now be considered // authenticated: The certificates are what we wanted, and everything // was well signed. // // The only remaining concern is certificate timeliness. If the // certificates are expired by an amount that is too large for the // declared clock skew to explain, then we'll return // `Error::HandshakeProto`: in that case the clock skew is _not_ // authenticated. But if the certs are only expired by a little bit, // we'll reject the handshake with `Error::HandshakeCertsExpired`, and // the caller can trust the clock skew. // // We note expired certs last, since we only want to return // `HandshakeCertsExpired` when there are no other errors. id_sk_timeliness?; sk_tls_timeliness?; rsa_cert_timeliness?; Ok(VerifiedChannel { channel_type: self.channel_type, link_protocol: self.link_protocol, framed_tls: self.framed_tls, unique_id: self.unique_id, target_method: self.target_method, ed25519_id: *identity_key, rsa_id, rsa_cert_digest: *rsa_cert.digest(), peer_cert_digest, clock_skew: self.clock_skew, sleep_prov: self.sleep_prov, memquota: self.memquota, }) } } impl< T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + StreamOps + Send + Unpin + 'static, S: CoarseTimeProvider + SleepProvider, > VerifiedChannel { /// The channel is used to send cells, and to create outgoing circuits. /// The reactor is used to route incoming messages to their appropriate /// circuit. #[instrument(skip_all, level = "trace")] pub(crate) async fn finish( mut self, ) -> Result<(Arc, super::reactor::Reactor)> { // We treat a completed channel -- that is to say, one where the // authentication is finished -- as incoming traffic. // // TODO: conceivably we should remember the time when we _got_ the // final cell on the handshake, and update the channel completion // time to be no earlier than _that_ timestamp. // // TODO: This shouldn't be here. This should be called in the trait functions that actually // receives the data (recv_*). We'll move it at a later commit. crate::note_incoming_traffic(); // We have finalized the handshake, move our codec to Open. self.framed_tls.codec_mut().set_open()?; debug!( stream_id = %self.unique_id, "Completed handshake with {} [{}]", self.ed25519_id, self.rsa_id ); // Grab a new handle on which we can apply StreamOps (needed for KIST). // On Unix platforms, this handle is a wrapper over the fd of the socket. // // Note: this is necessary because after `StreamExit::split()`, // we no longer have access to the underlying stream // or its StreamOps implementation. let stream_ops = self.framed_tls.new_handle(); let (tls_sink, tls_stream) = self.framed_tls.split(); let mut peer_builder = OwnedChanTargetBuilder::default(); if let Some(target_method) = self.target_method { if let Some(addrs) = target_method.socket_addrs() { peer_builder.addrs(addrs.to_owned()); } peer_builder.method(target_method); } let peer_id = peer_builder .ed_identity(self.ed25519_id) .rsa_identity(self.rsa_id) .build() .expect("OwnedChanTarget builder failed"); super::Channel::new( self.channel_type, self.link_protocol, Box::new(tls_sink), Box::new(tls_stream), stream_ops, self.unique_id, peer_id, self.clock_skew, self.sleep_prov, self.memquota, ) } } /// Helper: Calculate a clock skew from the [msg::Netinfo] cell data and the time at which we sent /// the [msg::Versions] cell. /// /// This is unauthenticated as in not validated with the certificates. Before using it, make sure /// that you have authenticated the other party. pub(crate) fn unauthenticated_clock_skew( netinfo_cell: &msg::Netinfo, netinfo_rcvd_at: coarsetime::Instant, versions_flushed_at: coarsetime::Instant, versions_flushed_wallclock: SystemTime, ) -> ClockSkew { // Try to compute our clock skew. It won't be authenticated yet, since we haven't checked // the certificates. if let Some(netinfo_timestamp) = netinfo_cell.timestamp() { let delay = netinfo_rcvd_at - versions_flushed_at; ClockSkew::from_handshake_timestamps( versions_flushed_wallclock, netinfo_timestamp, delay.into(), ) } else { ClockSkew::None } } #[cfg(test)] pub(super) mod test { #![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)] use hex_literal::hex; use regex::Regex; use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime}; use super::*; use crate::channel::handler::test::MsgBuf; use crate::channel::new_frame; use crate::util::fake_mq; use crate::{Result, channel::ClientInitiatorHandshake}; use tor_cell::chancell::msg; use tor_linkspec::OwnedChanTarget; use tor_rtcompat::{PreferredRuntime, Runtime}; const VERSIONS: &[u8] = &hex!("0000 07 0006 0003 0004 0005"); // no certificates in this cell, but connect() doesn't care. const NOCERTS: &[u8] = &hex!("00000000 81 0001 00"); const NETINFO_PREFIX: &[u8] = &hex!( "00000000 08 00000000 04 04 7f 00 00 02 01 04 04 7f 00 00 03" ); const NETINFO_PREFIX_WITH_TIME: &[u8] = &hex!( "00000000 08 48949290 04 04 7f 00 00 02 01 04 04 7f 00 00 03" ); const AUTHCHALLENGE: &[u8] = &hex!( "00000000 82 0026 FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 0002 0003 00ff" ); const VPADDING: &[u8] = &hex!("00000000 80 0003 FF FF FF"); fn add_padded(buf: &mut Vec, cell: &[u8]) { let len_prev = buf.len(); buf.extend_from_slice(cell); buf.resize(len_prev + 514, 0); } fn add_netinfo(buf: &mut Vec) { add_padded(buf, NETINFO_PREFIX); } #[test] fn connect_ok() -> Result<()> { tor_rtcompat::test_with_one_runtime!(|rt| async move { let now = humantime::parse_rfc3339("2008-08-02T17:00:00Z").unwrap(); let mut buf = Vec::new(); // versions cell buf.extend_from_slice(VERSIONS); // certs cell -- no certs in it, but this function doesn't care. buf.extend_from_slice(NOCERTS); // netinfo cell -- quite minimal. add_padded(&mut buf, NETINFO_PREFIX); let mb = MsgBuf::new(&buf[..]); let handshake = ClientInitiatorHandshake::new(mb, None, rt.clone(), fake_mq()); let unverified = handshake.connect(|| now).await?; assert_eq!(unverified.link_protocol(), 5); // No timestamp in the NETINFO, so no skew. assert_eq!(unverified.clock_skew(), ClockSkew::None); // Try again with some padding. let mut buf = Vec::new(); buf.extend_from_slice(VERSIONS); buf.extend_from_slice(NOCERTS); buf.extend_from_slice(VPADDING); buf.extend_from_slice(AUTHCHALLENGE); buf.extend_from_slice(VPADDING); add_padded(&mut buf, NETINFO_PREFIX_WITH_TIME); let mb = MsgBuf::new(&buf[..]); let handshake = ClientInitiatorHandshake::new(mb, None, rt.clone(), fake_mq()); let unverified = handshake.connect(|| now).await?; // Correct timestamp in the NETINFO, so no skew. assert_eq!(unverified.clock_skew(), ClockSkew::None); // Now pretend our clock is fast. let now2 = now + Duration::from_secs(3600); let mb = MsgBuf::new(&buf[..]); let handshake = ClientInitiatorHandshake::new(mb, None, rt.clone(), fake_mq()); let unverified = handshake.connect(|| now2).await?; assert_eq!( unverified.clock_skew(), ClockSkew::Fast(Duration::from_secs(3600)) ); Ok(()) }) } async fn connect_err>, S>(input: T, sleep_prov: S) -> Error where S: CoarseTimeProvider + SleepProvider, { let mb = MsgBuf::new(input); let handshake = ClientInitiatorHandshake::new(mb, None, sleep_prov, fake_mq()); handshake.connect(SystemTime::now).await.err().unwrap() } #[test] fn connect_badver() { tor_rtcompat::test_with_one_runtime!(|rt| async move { let err = connect_err(&b"HTTP://"[..], rt.clone()).await; assert!(matches!(err, Error::HandshakeProto(_))); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: Invalid CircID in variable cell" ); let err = connect_err(&hex!("0000 07 0004 1234 ffff")[..], rt.clone()).await; assert!(matches!(err, Error::HandshakeProto(_))); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: No shared link protocols" ); }); } #[test] fn connect_cellparse() { tor_rtcompat::test_with_one_runtime!(|rt| async move { let mut buf = Vec::new(); buf.extend_from_slice(VERSIONS); // Here's a certs cell that will fail. buf.extend_from_slice(&hex!("00000000 81 0001 01")[..]); let err = connect_err(buf, rt.clone()).await; assert!(matches!(err, Error::HandshakeProto { .. })); }); } #[test] fn connect_duplicates() { tor_rtcompat::test_with_one_runtime!(|rt| async move { let mut buf = Vec::new(); buf.extend_from_slice(VERSIONS); buf.extend_from_slice(NOCERTS); buf.extend_from_slice(NOCERTS); add_netinfo(&mut buf); let err = connect_err(buf, rt.clone()).await; assert!(matches!(err, Error::HandshakeProto(_))); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: Duplicate CERTS cell" ); let mut buf = Vec::new(); buf.extend_from_slice(VERSIONS); buf.extend_from_slice(NOCERTS); buf.extend_from_slice(AUTHCHALLENGE); buf.extend_from_slice(AUTHCHALLENGE); add_netinfo(&mut buf); let err = connect_err(buf, rt.clone()).await; assert!(matches!(err, Error::HandshakeProto(_))); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: Duplicate AUTH_CHALLENGE cell" ); }); } #[test] fn connect_missing_certs() { tor_rtcompat::test_with_one_runtime!(|rt| async move { let mut buf = Vec::new(); buf.extend_from_slice(VERSIONS); add_netinfo(&mut buf); let err = connect_err(buf, rt.clone()).await; assert!(matches!(err, Error::HandshakeProto(_))); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: Missing CERTS cell" ); }); } #[test] fn connect_missing_netinfo() { tor_rtcompat::test_with_one_runtime!(|rt| async move { let mut buf = Vec::new(); buf.extend_from_slice(VERSIONS); buf.extend_from_slice(NOCERTS); let err = connect_err(buf, rt.clone()).await; assert!(matches!(err, Error::HandshakeProto(_))); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: Missing NETINFO cell" ); }); } #[test] fn connect_misplaced_cell() { tor_rtcompat::test_with_one_runtime!(|rt| async move { let mut buf = Vec::new(); buf.extend_from_slice(VERSIONS); // here's a create cell. add_padded(&mut buf, &hex!("00000001 01")[..]); let err = connect_err(buf, rt.clone()).await; assert!(matches!(err, Error::HandshakeProto(_))); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: Decoding cell error: Error while parsing channel cell: Bad object: Unexpected command CREATE in HandshakeRelayResponderMsg" ); }); } fn make_unverified(certs: msg::Certs, runtime: R) -> UnverifiedChannel where R: Runtime, { let mut framed_tls = new_frame(MsgBuf::new(&b""[..]), ChannelType::ClientInitiator); let _ = framed_tls.codec_mut().set_link_version(4); let _ = framed_tls.codec_mut().set_open(); let clock_skew = ClockSkew::None; UnverifiedChannel { channel_type: ChannelType::ClientInitiator, link_protocol: 4, framed_tls, certs_cell: certs, clock_skew, target_method: None, unique_id: UniqId::new(), sleep_prov: runtime, memquota: fake_mq(), } } // Timestamp when the example certificates were all valid. fn cert_timestamp() -> SystemTime { use humantime::parse_rfc3339; parse_rfc3339("2020-09-26T18:01:20Z").unwrap() } fn certs_test( certs: msg::Certs, when: Option, peer_ed: &[u8], peer_rsa: &[u8], peer_cert_sha256: [u8; 32], runtime: &R, ) -> Result> where R: Runtime, { let unver = make_unverified(certs, runtime.clone()); let ed = Ed25519Identity::from_bytes(peer_ed).unwrap(); let rsa = RsaIdentity::from_bytes(peer_rsa).unwrap(); let chan = OwnedChanTarget::builder() .ed_identity(ed) .rsa_identity(rsa) .build() .unwrap(); unver.check_internal(&chan, peer_cert_sha256, when) } // no certs at all! #[test] fn certs_none() { let rt = PreferredRuntime::create().unwrap(); let err = certs_test( msg::Certs::new_empty(), None, &[0_u8; 32], &[0_u8; 20], [0_u8; 32], &rt, ) .err() .unwrap(); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: Missing IDENTITY_V_SIGNING certificate" ); } #[test] fn certs_good() { let rt = PreferredRuntime::create().unwrap(); let mut certs = msg::Certs::new_empty(); certs.push_cert_body(2.into(), certs::CERT_T2); certs.push_cert_body(5.into(), certs::CERT_T5); certs.push_cert_body(7.into(), certs::CERT_T7); certs.push_cert_body(4.into(), certs::CERT_T4); let res = certs_test( certs, Some(cert_timestamp()), certs::PEER_ED, certs::PEER_RSA, *certs::PEER_CERT_DIGEST, &rt, ); let _ = res.unwrap(); } #[test] fn certs_missing() { let rt = PreferredRuntime::create().unwrap(); let all_certs = [ (2, certs::CERT_T2, "Couldn't find RSA identity key"), (7, certs::CERT_T7, "No RSA->Ed crosscert"), (4, certs::CERT_T4, "Missing IDENTITY_V_SIGNING certificate"), (5, certs::CERT_T5, "Missing SIGNING_V_TLS_CERT certificate"), ]; for omit_idx in 0..4 { // build a certs cell with all but one certificate let mut certs = msg::Certs::new_empty(); let mut expect_err = None; for (idx, (ctype, cert, err)) in all_certs.iter().enumerate() { if idx == omit_idx { expect_err = Some(err); continue; } certs.push_cert_body((*ctype).into(), &cert[..]); } let res = certs_test( certs, Some(cert_timestamp()), certs::PEER_ED, certs::PEER_RSA, *certs::PEER_CERT_DIGEST, &rt, ) .err() .unwrap(); assert_eq!( format!("{}", res), format!("Handshake protocol violation: {}", expect_err.unwrap()) ); } } #[test] fn certs_wrongtarget() { let rt = PreferredRuntime::create().unwrap(); let mut certs = msg::Certs::new_empty(); certs.push_cert_body(2.into(), certs::CERT_T2); certs.push_cert_body(5.into(), certs::CERT_T5); certs.push_cert_body(7.into(), certs::CERT_T7); certs.push_cert_body(4.into(), certs::CERT_T4); let err = certs_test( certs.clone(), Some(cert_timestamp()), &[0x10; 32], certs::PEER_RSA, *certs::PEER_CERT_DIGEST, &rt, ) .err() .unwrap(); let re = Regex::new( // identities might be scrubbed by safelog r"Identity .* does not match target .*", ) .unwrap(); assert!(re.is_match(&format!("{}", err))); let err = certs_test( certs.clone(), Some(cert_timestamp()), certs::PEER_ED, &[0x99; 20], *certs::PEER_CERT_DIGEST, &rt, ) .err() .unwrap(); let re = Regex::new( // identities might be scrubbed by safelog r"Identity .* does not match target .*", ) .unwrap(); assert!(re.is_match(&format!("{}", err))); let err = certs_test( certs, Some(cert_timestamp()), certs::PEER_ED, certs::PEER_RSA, [0; 32], &rt, ) .err() .unwrap(); assert_eq!( format!("{}", err), "Handshake protocol violation: Peer cert did not authenticate TLS cert" ); } #[test] fn certs_badsig() { let rt = PreferredRuntime::create().unwrap(); fn munge(inp: &[u8]) -> Vec { let mut v: Vec = inp.into(); v[inp.len() - 1] ^= 0x10; v } let mut certs = msg::Certs::new_empty(); certs.push_cert_body(2.into(), certs::CERT_T2); certs.push_cert_body(5.into(), munge(certs::CERT_T5)); // munge an ed signature certs.push_cert_body(7.into(), certs::CERT_T7); certs.push_cert_body(4.into(), certs::CERT_T4); let res = certs_test( certs, Some(cert_timestamp()), certs::PEER_ED, certs::PEER_RSA, *certs::PEER_CERT_DIGEST, &rt, ) .err() .unwrap(); assert_eq!( format!("{}", res), "Handshake protocol violation: Invalid ed25519 signature in handshake" ); let mut certs = msg::Certs::new_empty(); certs.push_cert_body(2.into(), certs::CERT_T2); certs.push_cert_body(5.into(), certs::CERT_T5); certs.push_cert_body(7.into(), munge(certs::CERT_T7)); // munge an RSA signature certs.push_cert_body(4.into(), certs::CERT_T4); let res = certs_test( certs, Some(cert_timestamp()), certs::PEER_ED, certs::PEER_RSA, *certs::PEER_CERT_DIGEST, &rt, ) .err() .unwrap(); assert_eq!( format!("{}", res), "Handshake protocol violation: Bad RSA->Ed crosscert signature" ); } /// This module has a few certificates to play with. They're taken /// from a chutney network. They match those used in the CERTS /// cell test vector in the tor-cell crate. /// /// The names are taken from the type of the certificate. mod certs { use hex_literal::hex; pub(crate) const CERT_T2: &[u8] = &hex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pub(crate) const CERT_T4: &[u8] = &hex!( "01040006CC2A01F82294B866A31F01FC5D0DA8572850A9B929545C3266558D7D2316E3B74172B00100200400DCB604DB2034B00FD16986D4ADB9D16B21CB4E4457A33DEC0F538903683E96E9FF1A5203FA27F86EF7528D89A0845D2520166E340754FFEA2AAE0F612B7CE5DA094A0236CDAC45034B0B6842C18E7F6B51B93A3CF7E60663B8AD061C30A62602" ); pub(crate) const CERT_T5: &[u8] = &hex!( "01050006C98A03B4FD606B64E4CBD466B8D76CB131069BAE6F3AA1878857C9F624E31D77A799B8007173E5F8068431D0D3F5EE16B4C9FFD59DF373E152A87281BAE744AA5FCF72171BF4B27C4E8FC1C6A9FC5CA11058BC49647063D7903CFD9F512F89099B27BC0C" ); pub(crate) const CERT_T7: &[u8] = &hex!( "DCB604DB2034B00FD16986D4ADB9D16B21CB4E4457A33DEC0F538903683E96E90006DA3A805CF6006F9179066534DE6B45AD47A5C469063EE462762723396DC9F25452A0A52DA3F5087DD239F2A311F6B0D4DFEFF4ABD089DC3D0237A0ABAB19EB2045B91CDCAF04BE0A72D548A27BF2E77BD876ECFE5E1BE622350DA6BF31F6E306ED896488DD5B39409B23FC3EB7B2C9F7328EB18DA36D54D80575899EA6507CCBFCDF1F" ); pub(crate) const PEER_CERT_DIGEST: &[u8; 32] = &hex!("b4fd606b64e4cbd466b8d76cb131069bae6f3aa1878857c9f624e31d77a799b8"); pub(crate) const PEER_ED: &[u8] = &hex!("dcb604db2034b00fd16986d4adb9d16b21cb4e4457a33dec0f538903683e96e9"); pub(crate) const PEER_RSA: &[u8] = &hex!("2f1fb49bb332a9eec617e41e911c33fb3890aef3"); } #[test] fn test_finish() { tor_rtcompat::test_with_one_runtime!(|rt| async move { let ed25519_id = [3_u8; 32].into(); let rsa_id = [4_u8; 20].into(); let peer_addr = "127.1.1.2:443".parse().unwrap(); let mut framed_tls = new_frame(MsgBuf::new(&b""[..]), ChannelType::ClientInitiator); let _ = framed_tls.codec_mut().set_link_version(4); let ver = VerifiedChannel { channel_type: ChannelType::ClientInitiator, link_protocol: 4, framed_tls, unique_id: UniqId::new(), target_method: Some(ChannelMethod::Direct(vec![peer_addr])), ed25519_id, rsa_id, rsa_cert_digest: [0; 32], peer_cert_digest: [0; 32], clock_skew: ClockSkew::None, sleep_prov: rt, memquota: fake_mq(), }; let (_chan, _reactor) = ver.finish().await.unwrap(); // TODO: check contents of netinfo cell }); } }