# (Built-in defaults for the arti configuration format.)
# (This is an example file you can use as a template or as documentation.)

# Rules about how arti should behave as an application
[application]
# If true, we should watch our configuration files for changes.
#
# (Note that this feature may misbehave if you change symlinks in the
# paths to the directory holding the configuration files, if you
# remove and recreate those directories, or if those directories
# change for some other reason.)
#
# **Warning**: on platforms other than Windows, Linux, and Android,
# the files are watched using a polling watcher,
# which introduces a perceivable delay in configuration reloading,
# and can be very expensive for large file trees.
# This is due to a limitation in our file watching code,
# which we hope to lift someday.
#watch_configuration = false

# If true, we should allow other processes run by the same user to inspect this
# process's memory.
#
# (By default, assuming arti has been built with the `harden` feature flag, we
# take what step we can, including disabling core dumps, to keep its memory and
# state secret from other processes.)
#
#permit_debugging = false

# If true, then we allow Arti to start even if the current user is root.
#
# (By default, we exit if we are running as root, since this is usually a
# mistake.)
#allow_running_as_root = false

# Set up the Arti program to run as a proxy.
[proxy]
# Default port to use when listening to SOCKS connections
# (We listen on the loopback addresses by default.)
#
# You can also specify:
#  - Specific addresses ("127.0.0.1:9150")
#  - An automatically chosen port on an address ("127.0.0.1:auto")
#  - An automatically chosen port on the loopback addresses ("auto")
#  - A list of listening locations ([ 9150, "127.0.0.1:auto" ])
#
# Note that only one process can listen on a given port at a time.
#
# To disable socks listening entirely,
# you can set this to 0, false, or "" (the empty string).
#socks_listen = 9150

# Port to use to listen for DNS requests.
#
# The syntax here is the same as for socks_listen.
#dns_listen = 0

# If this is set to true (the default) and the `http-connect` feature
# is enabled, then all members of socks_listen also support the HTTP CONNECT
# proxy protocol, with extensions documented at
# https://spec.torproject.org/http-connect.html
#enable_http_connect = true

# Configure logging
[logging]

# Specify filtering directives for sending trace messages to the console
# (via stderr).
#
# It can be as simple as a single loglevel, or as complicated as a
# list with per-module settings.
#
# You can override this setting with the -l, --log-level command-line option.
#
# Example:
#     trace_filter = "info,tor_proto::channel=trace"
#
# For more information, see https://docs.rs/tracing-subscriber/0.2.20/tracing_subscriber/filter/struct.EnvFilter.html
#console = "info"

# As above, but specify filtering directives for sending trace messages to
# the system syslog. Empty string means not to use syslog.
#syslog = ""

# As above, but specify filtering directives for sending trace messages to
# the journald logging system.  Empty string means not to use journald.
#journald = ""

# You can also configure one or more log files, with different filters, and optional
# rotation.
#
# For example (not the default):
#files = [
#         {path = "~/logs/debug.log", filter="debug"},
#         {path = "~/logs/trace.log", filter="trace", rotate="daily"},
#]

# Whether to log sensitive information (such as target hostnames and ip addresses)
#
# If set to `false` (the default), such information is not logged in messages of
# level `info` or higher.
#log_sensitive_information = false

# Whether to promote protocol-violation log messages to warning level.
#
# If set to `false` (the default), protocol violations are logged at their
# original level. If set to `true`, violations of kind `TorProtocolViolation`
# are promoted to `warn`. Intended for use in private test networks.
#protocol_warnings = false

# The granularity with which to display times in our logs.
#
# When logging persistently, it can be risky to record very precise timing
# information: if the logs are later exposed or compromised, they can help
# traffic analysis attacks.
#
# To lower this risk, we support rounding the times in our logs, and displaying
# them with less precision.  This option configures the maximum degree of
# precision we'll use.  (We may use even a little less precision if you specify
# an odd interval of time.)
#
# This option can't affect the granularity of times recorded by logging systems
# outside of arti, including journald.
#
#time_granularity = "1s"

# If the experimental `opentelemetry` feature is enabled, spans can be exported
# to a HTTP(S) URL or to a JSON file in the https://opentelemetry.io format.
#
# Note that this information may be extremely sensitive. It is not recommended
# to use this outside of development and debugging usecases.
#
# Only one of `file` or `http` may be specified, due to limitations in the
# underlying tracing system.
#
# For example (not the default):
#     opentelemetry.file = { path = "~/logs/otel.json" }
#
# You can also specify a `batch` option on both `file` and `http` exporters, to
# configure how the writes are batched. The `http` exporter also supports
# setting a timeout. If not set, these will all be left at the OpenTelemetry
# defaults. For example (not the defaults):
#
#     opentelemetry.http = {endpoint = "http://localhost:4318/v1/traces", timeout = "15s", batch = { max_queue_size = 1024, max_export_batch_size = 256, scheduled_delay = "5s" } }


# If the experimental `tokio-console` feature is enabled, and you set this option to "true",
# arti can send trace information to tokio-console` for development and debugging purposes.
#
# To use this feature, you must make sure to build with `--cfg tokio_unstable`,
# or the console subscriber will panic on startup.
#
# Note that this option publishes low-level details at a local address that tokio-console
# can connect to, and may therefore be a security risk on some systems.
# Don't enable it for production environments; use containers when possible.
#
#     tokio_console.enabled = false

[metrics]

# Arti can export metrics, offering a Prometheus scraper endpoint.
# Usually only used when providing Tor Hidden Services (Onion Services).
#
# WARNING: exposing these metrics publicly is dangerous, and must be avoided.
# Currently only plaintext HTTP is supported, either on a localhost IPv4 port,
# or on a single other IPv4 or IPv6 address and port.
# There is no access control beyond that implied by listening only on localhost.
#
# The set of metrics currently available is quite limited, and not stable.
# We expect to extend it; MRs welcome.

# This suggested port is the same as the example in the C Tor tor(1) manpage.
# But note that the set of available metrics is quite different.
#
#    prometheus.listen = 9035

# Locations to use for storing things on disk.
#
# These paths can use ~ to indicate the user's home directory, or a set
# of shell-style variables to indicate platform-specific paths.
#
# Supported variables are ARTI_CACHE, ARTI_CONFIG, ARTI_SHARED_DATA,
# ARTI_LOCAL_DATA, and USER_HOME.
#
# Multiple processes can share the same cache_dir.  If they do, one of them
# will download directory information for all of the others.
[storage]
#cache_dir = "${ARTI_CACHE}"
#state_dir = "${ARTI_LOCAL_DATA}"

# A file in which to store a description of the proxy ports we're listening on.
#
# This is mostly useful if you've used "auto" in socks_listen, to find out
# which ports were automatically chosen.
#
# The format of this JSON is documented in the Arti source,
# in `crates/arti/src/proxy/port_info.rs`. (TODO: Replace with link.)
#port_info_file = "${ARTI_LOCAL_DATA}/public/port_info.json"

#[storage.keystore]
# Whether the keystore is enabled.
#
# If the `keymgr` feature is enabled and this option is:
#     * set to false, we will ignore the configured keystore path.
#     * set to "auto", the configured keystore, or the default keystore, if the
#     keystore path is not specified, will be used
#     * set to true, the configured keystore, or the default keystore, if the
#     keystore path is not specified, will be used
#
# If the `keymgr` feature is disabled and this option is:
#     * set to false, we will ignore the configured keystore path.
#     * set to "auto", we will ignore the configured keystore path.
#
# Setting this option to true when the `keymgr` feature is disabled is a
# configuration error. Setting this option to false when `kind` is not `auto`
# is a configuration error.
#enabled = "auto"

#[storage.keystore.primary]
# The type of primary keystore to use, if any
#
# If the `keymgr` feature is enabled, this option can be set to
#    * "auto", to use the default keystore (native)
#    * "native", to use the native keystore
#    * "ephemeral", to use the ephemeral keystore (only supported if the
#    `ephemeral-keystore` feature is enabled)
#
# If the `keymgr` feature is not enabled, this option has no effect,
# and can only be set to "auto".
#
# Setting this option to anything besides auto when the `keymgr`
# feature is disabled is a configuration error.
#kind = "auto"

# Optionally configure C Tor keystores for arti to use.
#
# Note: The keystores listed here are read-only (keys are only
# ever written to the primary keystore, configured in
# `storage.keystore.primary`).
#
# Each C Tor keystore **must**:
#
#   * have a unique identifier. It is an error to configure multiple keystores
#     with the same ID.
#   * have a corresponding arti hidden service configured in the
#   `[onion_services]` section with the same nickname
#
# For example:
#
# [storage.keystore.ctor.services."allium-cepa"]
#
# This should be set to the `HiddenServiceDirectory` of your hidden service.
# Arti will read `HiddenServiceDirectory/hostname`
# and `HiddenServiceDirectory/private_key`.
# (Note: if your service is running in restricted discovery mode, you must also set the
# `[[onion_services."<the nickname of your svc>".restricted_discovery.key_dirs]]`
# to `HiddenServiceDirectory/client_keys`).
# path = "/var/lib/tor/allium_cepa"
#
# The identifier of this keystore.
# id = "foo"

# [[storage.keystore.ctor.clients]]
#
# The identifier of this keystore.
# id = "bar"
#
# This should be set to the `ClientOnionAuthDir` of your client.
# If Arti is configured to run as a client (i.e. if it runs in SOCKS proxy mode),
# it will read the client restricted discovery keys from this path.
#
# The key files are expected to have the `.auth_private` extension,
# and their content **must** be of the form:
# `<56-char-onion-addr-without-.onion-part>:descriptor:x25519:<x25519 private key in base32>`.
#
# Malformed files, and files that don't have the `.auth_private` extension, will be ignored.
# path = "/var/lib/tor/onion_auth"

# Describe how to enforce permissions on the filesystem when accessing the cache
# and state directories.  (This does not apply to configuration files)
[storage.permissions]
# If set to true, we ignore all filesystem permissions.
#dangerously_trust_everyone = false

# What user (if any) is trusted to own files and directories?  ":current" means
# to trust the current user.
#trust_user = ":current"

# What group (if any) is trusted to have read/write access to files and
# directories?  ":selfnamed" means to trust the group with the same name as the
# current user, if that user is a member.
#trust_group = ":username"

# If set, gives a path prefix that will always be trusted.  For example, if this
# option is set to "/home/", and we are checking "/home/username/.cache", then
# we always accept the permissions on "/" and "/home", but we check the
# permissions on "/home/username" and "/home/username/.cache".
#
# (This is not the default.)
#
#     ignore_prefix = "/home/"
#ignore_prefix = ""

# Bridges (for anticensorship support)
[bridges]

# Should we use configured bridges?
#     If set to false, we will ignore the configured bridges.
#     If set to "auto", we will use any bridges that are configured.
#     If set to true, bridges must be configured and will be used.
#enabled = "auto"

# What bridges (including pluggable transports) to use, in this syntax:
#  bridges = [
#      "<IP>:<ORPort> <fingerprint> [<fingerprint> ...]",
#      "<transport> <host>:<ORPort>|- <fingerprint> [...] [<key>=<val> ...]",
#  ]
#
# For example:
#  bridges = [
#      "192.0.2.83:80 $0bac39417268b96b9f514ef763fa6fba1a788956",
#      "[2001:db8::3150]:8080 $0bac39417268b96b9f514e7f63fa6fb1aa788957",
#      "obfs4 bridge.example.net:80 $0bac39417268b69b9f514e7f63fa6fba1a788958 ed25519:dGhpcyBpcyBbpmNyZWRpYmx5IHNpbGx5ISEhISEhISA iat-mode=1",
#  ]
#
# You may specify all the bridge lines in one multi-line string:
#  bridges = '''
#  192.0.2.83:80 $0bac39417268b96b9f514ef763fa6fba1a788956
#  [2001:db8::3150]:8080 $0bac39417268b96b9f514e7f63fa6fb1aa788957
#  obfs4 bridge.example.net:80 $0bac39417268b69b9f514e7f63fa6fba1a788958 ed25519:dGhpcyBpcyBbpmNyZWRpYmx5IHNpbGx5ISEhISEhISA iat-mode=1
#  '''
#
# (Note that these are just examples, not real bridges - they will not work.)
#
#bridges = []

# An example managed pluggable transport binary.
#    [[bridges.transports]]

# Which pluggable transports does this binary provide?
#    protocols = ["obfs4", "obfs5"]

# Path to the binary to be run.
#    path = "/usr/bin/obfsproxy"

# Any command-line arguments to pass to the binary (empty if not specified).
#    arguments = ["-obfs4", "-obfs5"]

# Should we run this binary on startup? If false or unspecified, the binary will be
# launched when we first attempt to use any of the transports it provides instead.
#    run_on_startup = true

# An example unmanaged pluggable transport.
#    [[bridges.transports]]
#
# Which protocols does this transport provide?
#    protocols = ["obfs4"]
#
# Where can we contact this transport?
# (This should be a local SOCKS5 proxy address.)
#    proxy_addr = "127.0.0.1:31337"

# Replacement values for consensus parameters.  This is an advanced option
# and you probably should leave it alone. Not all parameters are supported.
# These are case-sensitive.
#
[override_net_params]
# For example (not the defaults):
#     circwindow = 1000
#     min_paths_for_circs_pct = 60

# Configuration for timing when and how often we should download directory
# information.
#
# We use a randomized algorithm for determining when to retry. With
# the various retry_* options, "num" is the number of downloads to
# attempt, and "initial_delay" is a parameter determining both our
# _first_ delay before we reattempt, and our _minimum_ delay for
# subsequent attempts.
[download_schedule]

# How to retry our initial bootstrapping when we're trying to start up.
#retry_bootstrap = { attempts = 128, initial_delay = "1 sec", parallelism = 1 }

# How to retry a single consensus download.
#retry_consensus = { attempts = 3, initial_delay = "1 sec", parallelism = 1 }

# How to retry a set of authority certificate downloads.
#retry_certs = { attempts = 3, initial_delay = "1 sec", parallelism = 1 }

# How to retry a set of microdescriptor downloads.
#retry_microdescs = { attempts = 3, initial_delay = "1 sec", parallelism = 4 }

# Information about how premature or expired our directories are allowed to be.
#
# These options help us tolerate clock skew, and help survive the case where the
# directory authorities are unable to reach consensus for a while.
[directory_tolerance]
# For how long before a directory document is valid should we accept it?
#pre_valid_tolerance = "1 day"

# For how long after a directory document is valid should we consider it usable?
#post_valid_tolerance = "3 days"

# Tells the circuit manager rule for constructing circuit paths
[path_rules]

# How far apart do relays need to be in IP-space before they can be
# used in the same circuit?  For example, "ipv4_subnet_family_prefix=16"
# means that two relays cannot appear in the same circuit if their
# IPv4 addresses begin with the same 16 bits.
#ipv4_subnet_family_prefix = 16
#ipv6_subnet_family_prefix = 32

# Which addresses are we willing to contact directly?
#
# This option can be used to specify a set of addresses or ports that are
# permitted: typically, because a local firewall blocks everything else.  For
# example, [ "*:80", "*:443"] would only try to connect to relays on the network
# that support port 80 or port 443. You can use prefix lengths and port ranges,
# too: "198.51.100.0/24:1-1024" is a valid pattern.
#
# By default, all addresses and ports are permitted.
#reachable_addrs = [ "*:*" ]

# Which target (exit) ports may require long-lived connections?
#
# When we connect to a port on this list, we only consider relays that have the
# Stable flag, indicating that they have a relatively high time between circuit
# failures.
#long_lived_ports = [ 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300 ]

# Configure preemptive circuit construction.
#
# Preemptive circuits are built ahead of time, to anticipate client need. This
# section configures the way in which this demand is anticipated and in which
# these circuits are constructed.
[preemptive_circuits]
# If we have at least this many available circuits, we suspend
# construction of preemptive circuits. whether our available circuits
# support our predicted exit ports or not.
#disable_at_threshold = 12

# At startup, which exit ports should we expect that the client will want?
#
# (Over time, new ports are added to this list in response to what the client
# has actually requested.)
#initial_predicted_ports = [80, 443]

# After we see the client request a connection to a new port, how long should we
# predict that the client will still want to have circuits available for that
# port?
#prediction_lifetime = "1 hour"

# How many available circuits should we try to have, at minimum, for each
# predicted exit port?
#min_exit_circs_for_port = 2

# Configuration information about the Tor network itself
[tor_network]
# List of locations to look in when downloading directory information
# we don't actually have a directory yet.
#
#   fallback_caches = [ <default list is compiled-in > ]

# List of directory authorities which we expect to sign consensus documents and
# to download directory information from, if we are a directory mirror.
#
# Usually, you do not want to modify this setting unless you are running arti
# in a test environment.
#  [tor_network.authorities]
#  # SHA1 fingerprints of the directory authority identity keys.
#  v3idents = [
#    [
#      "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
#    ]
#  ]
#  # IP addresses/ports for each authority to upload to (as a relay).
#  uploads = [
#    [
#      # Each logical authority is grouped to support dual-stack.
#      "198.51.100.0:80",
#      "[2001:db8::1]:80"
#    ]
#  ]
#  # IP addresses/ports for each authority to download from (as a dirmirror).
#  downloads = [
#    [
#      # Each logical authority is grouped to support dual-stack.
#      "198.51.100.0:80",
#      "[2001:db8::1]:80"
#    ]
#  ]
#  # IP addresses/ports for each authority to send votes to (as a dirauth).
#  votes = [
#    [
#      # Each logical authority is grouped to support dual-stack.
#      "198.51.100.0:80",
#      "[2001:db8::1]:80"
#    ]
#  ]

# Channels and their behaviour
[channel]

# Should we use reduced channel padding?  (This roughly halves the padding
# cell frequency, and makes the padding unidirectional, increasing the
# traceability of the client connections.)
# Or disable it entirely?
#
#padding = "normal"
#   padding = "reduced"
#   padding = "none"

# Full manual control of the precise padding timing parameters is available
# by setting `override_net_params.nf_ito_low` et al.
# (See torpsec/padding-spec.txt section 3.4.)

# Configure an outbound proxy for connecting to the Tor network.
#
# If set, Arti will connect to the Tor network via this proxy
# instead of making direct connections to Tor relays.
#
# Supported proxy types:
#
#   SOCKS:
#     - socks4://ip:port            - SOCKS4 proxy without authentication
#     - socks4a://ip:port           - SOCKS4a proxy (same as socks4)
#     - socks5://ip:port            - SOCKS5 proxy without authentication
#     - socks5://user:pass@ip:port  - SOCKS5 proxy with username/password auth
#
#   HTTP CONNECT:
#     - http://ip:port              - HTTP CONNECT proxy without authentication
#     - http://user:pass@ip:port    - HTTP CONNECT proxy with Basic authentication
#
# Proxy server hostnames are not currently supported; use an IP literal.
#
# IPv6 addresses should be enclosed in brackets: socks5://[::1]:1080
#
# Examples:
#   outbound_proxy = "socks5://127.0.0.1:1080"
#   outbound_proxy = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
#   outbound_proxy = "http://user:pass@192.168.1.1:3128"
#   outbound_proxy = "socks5://[::1]:1080"
#
# By default, no outbound proxy is used.
#outbound_proxy = ""

# Rules for how long circuits should survive, and how long pending
# requests should wait for a circuit.
[circuit_timing]

# Once a circuit has been used for a weakly isolated request,
# we stop giving it out for other requests after this time.
#
# (A request is weakly isolated if the application did not specify
# an isolation string as part of the proxy handshake.)
#max_dirtiness = "10 minutes"

# If a circuit has only been used for strongly isolated requests,
# we retain it until it has been idle for at least this long.
#disused_circuit_timeout = "60 minutes"

# When a circuit is requested, we keep trying to build circuits for up
# to this long before the request gives up.
#request_timeout = "60 sec"

# When a circuit is requested, we make up to this many attempts to build
# circuits for it before the request gives up.
#request_max_retries = 16

# If a circuit is finished that would satisfy a pending request, but the
# request is still waiting for its own circuits to complete, the request
# will wait this long before using the unexpectedly available circuit.
#request_loyalty = "50 msec"

# When we're trying to connect to a hidden service (.onion service),
# how many attempts  will we make to (i) download the descriptor from the directories
# (ii) conduct the introduction and rendezvous exchange, before giving up.
#hs_desc_fetch_attempts = 6
#hs_intro_rend_attempts = 6

# Rules for which addresses a client is willing to try to connect to over
# the tor network.
[address_filter]

# Should we allow attempts to make Tor connections to local addresses?
#allow_local_addrs = false

# Should Arti make connections to hidden services (.onion services) ?
#allow_onion_addrs = true

# Rules for how long streams should wait when connecting to host or performing a
# DNS lookup.
#
# These timeouts measure the permitted time between sending a request on an
# established circuit, and getting a response from the exit node.
[stream_timeouts]

# How long should we wait before timing out a stream when connecting to a host?
#connect_timeout = "10 sec"

# How long should we wait before timing out when resolving a DNS record?
#resolve_timeout = "10 sec"

# How long should we wait before timing out when resolving a DNS PTR record?
#resolve_ptr_timeout = "10 sec"

# Configuration for the system resources used by Arti.
[system]

# What is the maximum number of file descriptors which should be available
# to Arti when we launch?
#max_files = 16384

## Are we limiting memory use, and if so to how much?

# Maximum tracked memory use, after which reclamation starts.
#
# The default is "auto", which uses a value derived from the total system
# memory. It should not be assumed that the value used for "auto" will remain
# stable across different versions of arti. The value used for "auto" may also
# take into account other OS-specific features, such as cgroups on Linux.
#
# Note that not all memory usage is tracked: Arti can actually
# use more memory than is listed here for various kinds of overhead.
#
# If `system.memory.low_water` is given as an explicit value,
# `system.memory.max` must also be given as an explicit value.
#
#    memory.max = "8 GiB"

# Low-water mark for tracked memory:
# When reclaiming memory, we stop when we reach this amount.
#
# The default is "auto", which uses 3/4 of `system.memory.max`. It should not be
# assumed that the value used for "auto" will remain stable across different
# versions of arti.
#
#    memory.low_water = "6 GiB"

##### ONION SERVICES
#
# NOTE: Some of the security features needed for onion service privacy
# are not yet implemented.  See
# <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/blob/main/doc/OnionService.md>
# for more information.
#
# Configuration for an onion service.  You can include multiple
# `[onion_services]` sections in order to configure multiple onion services.
#
# The second part of this section's name ("allum-cepa") is a local nickname
# for this onion service.
#
# This nickname is saved on disk, and used to tell onion services apart;
# it is not visible outside your own Arti instance.
#
#    [onion_services."allium-cepa"]

# Whether this service should be started. When this option is:
#   * unset or set to true, the service will run with `arti proxy`.
#   * set to false, the service will not run.
#
#    enabled = true

# A description of what to do with incoming connections to different ports.
# This is given as a list of rules; the first matching rule applies.
#
#    proxy_ports = [
#        # Forward port 80 on the service to localhost:10080.
#        ["80", "127.0.0.1:10080"],
#        # Tear down the circuit on attempts to connect to port 22.
#        ["22", "destroy"],
#        # Ignore attempts to connect to port 265.
#        # ("ignore" is not generally a good idea for an anonymous service;
#        #  "destroy" is safer.)
#        ["265", "ignore"],
#        # Reject attempts to connect to port 443.
#        ["443", "reject"],
#        # Any other connection attempts will make us destroy the circuit.
#        # (This is the default; you do not need to include this line.)
#        ["*", "destroy"]
#    ]

# Number of introduction points to establish and advertise.
#
#    num_intro_points = 3

# A rate-limit on the acceptable rate of introduction requests.
#
# Consists of two parameters: the allowed client introduction rate per second
# and maximum number of introductions in a single burst, which correspond to the C Tor
# HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec and
# HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec options, respectively.
# If either of these parameters is set to 0, the defense is disabled,
# and the introduction point will ignore the other parameter.
#
# We send this to the introduction point to configure how many
# introduction requests it sends us.
# If this is not set, the introduction point chooses a default based on
# the current consensus.
#
# We do not enforce this limit ourselves.
#
# This configuration is sent as a `DOS_PARAMS` extension, as documented in
# <https://spec.torproject.org/rend-spec/introduction-protocol.html#EST_INTRO_DOS_EXT>.
#
#   rate_limit_at_intro = [25, 200]

# How many streams will we allow at a time for each circuit?
#
# If a client attempts to open more than this many streams on a rendezvous circuit,
# the circuit will be torn down.
#
# Equivalent to C Tor's HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit option.
#
#    max_concurrent_streams_per_circuit = 65535

# Whether to enable proof-of-work based DOS mitigation when under high load.
#
#    enable_pow = false

# The maximum number of entries allowed in the rendezvous request queue when PoW is enabled.
#
# If you are seeing dropped requests, have a bursty traffic pattern, and have some memory to
# spare, you may want to increase this. Each entry will take a few KB. If this is reduced at
# runtime, it may prevent new requests from coming in until the queue is smaller than the new
# size, but it will not drop existing requests that are in the queue.
#
#    pow_rend_queue_depth = 8192

#    [onion_services."allium-cepa".restricted_discovery]
# Whether to enable restricted discovery mode.
#
# Services running in restricted discovery mode are only discoverable
# by the configured clients.
#
# Can only be enabled if the `restricted-discovery` feature is enabled.
#
# If you enable this, you must also specify the authorized clients (via `static_keys`),
# or the directories where the authorized client keys should be read from (via `key_dirs`).
#
# Restricted discovery mode is disabled by default.
#
#    enabled = true

#    [[onion_services."allium-cepa".restricted_discovery.key_dirs]]
# Directories containing the client keys, each in the
# `descriptor:x25519:<base32-encoded-x25519-public-key>` format.
#
# Each file in this directory must have a file name of the form `<nickname>.auth`,
# where `<nickname>` is a valid client nickname.
#
#    path = "/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/authorized_clients"

# A static mapping from client nicknames to keys.
#
# Each client key must be in the `descriptor:x25519:<base32-encoded-x25519-public-key>`
# format.
#
#    [onion_services."allium-cepa".restricted_discovery.static_keys]
#    alice = "descriptor:x25519:PU63REQUH4PP464E2Y7AVQ35HBB5DXDH5XEUVUNP3KCPNOXZGIBA"
#    bob = "descriptor:x25519:B5ZQGTPERMMUDA6VC63LHJUF5IHPOKJMUK26LY2XKSF7VG52AESQ"

##### RPC
# Configuration options for the RPC subsystem.
# The RPC subsystem allows other applications to access Arti, and control its behavior.
# It is only available if Arti was built with RPC support.
#
#    [rpc]
#
# A boolean to determine whether Arti should accept RPC connections.
#
#    enable = false
#
# A set of default locations where Arti should listen for RPC connections,
# if none were configured. You should typically not override this.
# Use specific rpc.listen options instead.
#
#    # listen_default = [ <A list of platform-dependent default connect points, as strings> ]
#
# Instead, if you want to override the ways in which Arti listens for RPC connections,
# you should declare one or more of these [rpc.listen] sections.
# Each of them specifies a place where Arti will look for "connect files".
# (These are JSON files that tell Arti where to listen for connections,
# and tell applications how to connect to Arti.
# For more information on their format, see the RPC documentation at
# https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/tree/main/doc/dev/rpc-book)
#
# The defaults are:
#
#    [rpc.listen."user-default"]
#    enable = true
#    dir = "${ARTI_LOCAL_DATA}/rpc/connect.d"
#
#    [rpc.listen."system-default"]
#    enable = false
#    dir = "/etc/arti-rpc/connect.d"
#
# Available options for configuring connect points are as follows.
# Each listener section is introduced with a label. This can be an arbitrary identifier.
#
#       [rpc.listen."label"]
#
# A boolean to enable or disable the entire listener section. (Default is 'true')
#
#       enable = true
#
# A single connect file.
#
#       file = "${HOME}/.arti_connect.json"
#
# A directory to search for connect files.  Only filenames ending with ".json" are considered.
# This option is mutually exclusive with "file".
# Exactly one of "file" and "dir" must be set.
#
#       dir = "${HOME}/.my_connect_files/"
#
# A map from filenames within "dir" to options to set on those files.
# Currently only "enable" is supported.
#
#       file_options = { "bad_file.json" = { enable = false }}

[vanguards]
# The kind of vanguard to use when building onion service circuits.
#
# If the `vanguards` feature is enabled and this option can be set to
#    * "auto", to use the default setting (lite vanguards)
#    * "full", to enable full vanguards
#    * "lite", to enable lite vanguards
#    * "disabled", to disable vanguards
#
# If the `vanguards` feature is not enabled, "auto" has the same effect as
# "disabled".
#
# Setting this option to anything other than "auto" or "disabled" when
# the `vanguards` feature is disabled is a configuration error.
#mode = "auto"

# Support for overriding Arti's behavior when a required or recommended protocol is missing.
#
# Ordinarily, Arti will exit when the consensus says that some protocol is required,
# and Arti does not support that protocol.  You can override this behavior
# by listing that protocol here.
#
# It is almost always better to upgrade Arti than to use this feature.
#
#[use_obsolete_software]
#
# A space-separated list of protocols. Protocols have names like "Cons=4" or "Relay=3".
#
#ignore_missing_required_protocols = ""