| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| * | rpc-connect: Abort on misformed cookie file, and explain why. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-27 | 1 | -6/+3 |
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| * | rpc-connect: Use file_access() API, and permit symlinks. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-27 | 1 | -7/+11 |
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| * | rpc: Expose Cookie::load unconditionally. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-15 | 1 | -2/+0 |
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| * | rpc: Use symbolic constants for nonce/mac lengths. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-15 | 1 | -7/+14 |
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| * | rpc: Tests for cookie nonce/mac encoding/decoding. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-15 | 1 | -2/+46 |
| | | | | | Also fix a bug in decoding, where we accepted too-short strings. | ||||
| * | rpc: Tweak cookie protocol to bind both nonces. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-15 | 1 | -2/+8 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Previously participants in the cookie protocol only bound the peer nonce in their MACs. With this change, they bind both nonces. This change is _probably_ not necessary for security, but it can't hurt. It follows a general principle that Adam Langley told me a long time ago: you won't regret binding more, but you might regret binding less. | ||||
| * | arti-rpcserver: Server side of cookie auth. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-15 | 1 | -2/+25 |
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| * | tor-rpc-connect: Cryptographic support for cookie auth. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-15 | 1 | -2/+208 |
| | | | | | Conforms to rpc-cookie-sketch.md. | ||||
| * | tor-rpc-connect: defer loading auth cookies on the client side. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-15 | 1 | -1/+22 |
| | | | | | | We want to load cookies only after we've connected and gotten a banner. | ||||
| * | tor-rpc-connect: move cookie auth support to its own module. | Nick Mathewson | 2025-01-15 | 1 | -0/+167 |
