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With this change, we no longer expose the ExpandedSecretKey
unescorted, which makes it harder to misuse the API.
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This code was needed with the old version of dalek-cryptography,
which wasn't compatible with up-to-date versions of the `rand`
crate(s). But now that we've upgraded, we can drop this.
(We could have left it around and deprecated it, but we are already
making a breaking change to tor-llcrypto by upgrading
dalek-cryptography.)
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The main changes that we have to adjust for are as follows:
* In x25519-dalek:
* `StaticSecret` is now behind a feature.
* `StaticSecret::new` is deprecated in favor of
`StaticSecret::random_from_rng`.
* StaticSecret no longer does its own clamping.
* In ed25519-dalek:
* `SecretKey` has (in effect) been renamed to `SigningKey`. The name
`SecretKey` is now an alias for `[u8; 32]`.
* `SigningKey` is effectively a keypair, since it contains a
public key as well.
* `PublicKey` has been renamed to `VerifyingKey`.
* The functions to extract a signing key and verifying key have
been renamed as you might expect.
* `ExpandedSecretKey` has been moved to `hasmat` and no longer
implements `sign`.
* `ExpanededSecretKey` now has as its elements a scalar and a hash
prefix.
* Various functions that took `&[u8]` now take `&[u8; N]`.
* We no longer need a wrapper for older versions of rand.
There is a single test in tor-keymgr that does not pass. I've
marked it as ignore for now, in hopes that @gabi-250 can help me
figure it out.
This closes #808. There are several changes I want to make before
we merge, however. They are marked with TODO DALEK.
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Per #798, we want to make sure that we never pass around an
`ed25519::SecretKey`; only an `ed25519::Keypair` (or
`ExpandedKeypair`). This is because, when you're computing an
ed25519 signature, you have to use the public key as one of your
inputs, and if you ever use a mismatched public key you are
vulnerable to a nonce reuse attack.
(For more info see
https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2020/001012.html )
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This warning kind of snuck up on us! (See #748) For now, let's
disable it. (I've cleaned it up in a couple of examples, since
those are meant to be more idiomatic and user-facing.)
Closes #748.
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This is in lieu of upgrading to the latest base64 crate, which has
a different API from the old one. Since we have to migrate either
way, we might as well use base64ct everywhere.
I don't think that most of these cases _require_ constant-time
base64, but it won't hurt.
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Fix nightly clippy
See merge request tpo/core/arti!729
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There are some places in the protocol where we have an all-zero RSA
identity that does not truly represent a key, but rather represents
an absent or unknown key. For these, it's better to use
`RsaIdentity::is_zero` instead of manually checking for a set of
zero bytes: it expresses the intent better, and ensures that the
operation is constant-time.
I am deliberately not introducing a more general IsZero trait here,
or implementing is_zero for anything else: This is the only one we
seem to need right now. We can generalize it later if we have to.
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This only affects uses of thread_rng(), and affects them all more or
less indiscriminately. One test does not work with
ARTI_TEST_PRNG=deterministic; the next commit will fix it.
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Now that we require Rust 1.56, we can upgrade to AES 0.8. This
forces us to have some slight API changes.
We require cipher 0.4.1, not cipher 0.4.0, since 0.4.0 has
compatibility issues with Rust 1.56.
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Remove all `use` statements for `TryFrom` and `TryInto`. These are
now redundant in Rust 2021.
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We perform this operation in a bunch of places, and most of them
use hex::decode(). That's not great, since hex::decode() has to do
heap allocation. This implementation uses hex::decode_to_slice(),
which should be faster.
(In the future we might choose to use one of the faster hex
implementations, but I'm hoping that this change will be sufficient
to get hex decoding out of our profiles.)
Part of #377.
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I'm going to change the code that does this, so add a test first
to check the output doesn't change.
At some point we should have more RSA tests.
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This exception is no longer necessary now that the underlying CI bug
is fixed.
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We don't currently need a couple of the key manipulation features
that we have, since we aren't yet doing relays or onion service
clients.
Part of #125
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This will cause some pain for now, but now is really the best time
to do this kind of thing.
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