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(These types were all already re-exported from pk::ed25519.)
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This code was needed with the old version of dalek-cryptography,
which wasn't compatible with up-to-date versions of the `rand`
crate(s). But now that we've upgraded, we can drop this.
(We could have left it around and deprecated it, but we are already
making a breaking change to tor-llcrypto by upgrading
dalek-cryptography.)
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The main changes that we have to adjust for are as follows:
* In x25519-dalek:
* `StaticSecret` is now behind a feature.
* `StaticSecret::new` is deprecated in favor of
`StaticSecret::random_from_rng`.
* StaticSecret no longer does its own clamping.
* In ed25519-dalek:
* `SecretKey` has (in effect) been renamed to `SigningKey`. The name
`SecretKey` is now an alias for `[u8; 32]`.
* `SigningKey` is effectively a keypair, since it contains a
public key as well.
* `PublicKey` has been renamed to `VerifyingKey`.
* The functions to extract a signing key and verifying key have
been renamed as you might expect.
* `ExpandedSecretKey` has been moved to `hasmat` and no longer
implements `sign`.
* `ExpanededSecretKey` now has as its elements a scalar and a hash
prefix.
* Various functions that took `&[u8]` now take `&[u8; N]`.
* We no longer need a wrapper for older versions of rand.
There is a single test in tor-keymgr that does not pass. I've
marked it as ignore for now, in hopes that @gabi-250 can help me
figure it out.
This closes #808. There are several changes I want to make before
we merge, however. They are marked with TODO DALEK.
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Before version 10.6, `Shake256Reader` is incorrectly defined using
`Shake256Core` instead of `Shake256ReaderCore`. As a result, attempting
to instantiate `Shake256Reader` fails at compile time.
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This will be useful in preference to the regular Mac trait for the
places where we need to pass a Mac key around, but we don't need to
support incremental operation.
Part of arti#993, where we want to expose a MAC object without
exposing sensitive data.
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In `ArtiNativeKeyStore`, private keys are stored in OpenSSH format.
However, `ssh-key` (the crate we use for parsing OpenSSH keys) doesn't
support x25519 keys. As a workaround, this type of key will stored
as ed25519 and converted to x25519 upon retrieval.
This commit implements the `convert_ed25519_to_curve25519_private`
conversion function (needed by `ArtiNativeKeyStore` to support x25519
keys).
Part of #900
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This is mostly code movement; you may want to review it with
`--color-moved`.
I'm doing this so we can also use the function in netdoc for
looking up hsdesc authentication.
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Expose ED25519 signature length; make ValidatableEd25519Signature
implement Debug and Clone.
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There are some places in the protocol where we have an all-zero RSA
identity that does not truly represent a key, but rather represents
an absent or unknown key. For these, it's better to use
`RsaIdentity::is_zero` instead of manually checking for a set of
zero bytes: it expresses the intent better, and ensures that the
operation is constant-time.
I am deliberately not introducing a more general IsZero trait here,
or implementing is_zero for anything else: This is the only one we
seem to need right now. We can generalize it later if we have to.
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