<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>mirrors/arti.git/crates/fs-mistrust/src, branch arti-v0.4.0</title>
<subtitle>mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti
</subtitle>
<id>http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/atom?h=arti-v0.4.0</id>
<link rel='self' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/atom?h=arti-v0.4.0'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/'/>
<updated>2022-05-25T14:27:45Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>fs-mistrust: allow symlinks to have any permissions</title>
<updated>2022-05-25T14:27:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alex Xu (Hello71)</name>
<email>alex_y_xu@yahoo.ca</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-24T20:17:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=85b4b5620d294b27cdee01989d4f2a936f6f32f4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:85b4b5620d294b27cdee01989d4f2a936f6f32f4</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Use serde attrs instead of manual impls</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T14:54:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-24T14:15:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=924cc380d478e2b4a6b2b7bacbbe780e3b8fee7c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:924cc380d478e2b4a6b2b7bacbbe780e3b8fee7c</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Make fs-mistrust configurable from the top level.</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T14:54:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-23T15:31:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=b1fc4bd03bb4024cd5a467ccb682e88adf30bac7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b1fc4bd03bb4024cd5a467ccb682e88adf30bac7</id>
<content type='text'>
This change requires a little refactoring of TorClientBuilder: now,
instead of enabling or disabling mistrust, it enables or disables
the decision to _override_ the mistrust in the config.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Write custom serde impls for Trusted{User,Group}</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T14:54:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-20T19:15:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=12f2a47fcb42ea3ccf3456a034dbdec82a8f0953'/>
<id>urn:sha1:12f2a47fcb42ea3ccf3456a034dbdec82a8f0953</id>
<content type='text'>
We support all of the following (in TOML notation):

```
user = "rose"  # by name
user = 413     # by ID
user = false   # no user
user = ":current"  # A 'special' user.

user = { name: "rose" }
user = { id: 413 }
user = { special: ":none" }
user = { special: ":current" }
```
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add serde derives for MistrustBuilder.</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T14:54:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T20:29:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=9dd7b99de1b8bf8625cf6de93770dda25fe2823b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9dd7b99de1b8bf8625cf6de93770dda25fe2823b</id>
<content type='text'>
The Group and User (de)serialization is pretty ugly, and I can't
vouch for the correcness of MistrustBuilder.  I will seek feedback
before I proceed.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs-mistrust: Add Group and User types.</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T14:54:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T18:36:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=330582a142e30a80fe5f62af043955ca7373b7e7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:330582a142e30a80fe5f62af043955ca7373b7e7</id>
<content type='text'>
This will help make the actual configuration more serializable,
I hope.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs-mistrust: make Mistrust have a corresponding Builder type.</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T14:54:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T17:26:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=95200383b52d1644d4de357c2a8a50d91fdc1021'/>
<id>urn:sha1:95200383b52d1644d4de357c2a8a50d91fdc1021</id>
<content type='text'>
This is an approximately minimal revision to get Builder in place;
subsequent commits will clean up the API.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs-mistrust: rename fields</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T14:54:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T15:52:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=baa58daace392eee68f8ff82841631e9114c9918'/>
<id>urn:sha1:baa58daace392eee68f8ff82841631e9114c9918</id>
<content type='text'>
This renaming will make things slightly simpler for declaring a
builder.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'use-fs-mistrust'</title>
<updated>2022-05-09T19:27:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-09T19:27:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=4262e9d0ecca5f77f6ee2e0b00fb8c35d65f01e3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4262e9d0ecca5f77f6ee2e0b00fb8c35d65f01e3</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Loosen checking for readable files within target directories.</title>
<updated>2022-05-09T18:40:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Mathewson</name>
<email>nickm@torproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-09T16:01:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/commit/?id=5c33499f288c298c3db8dfc7725448db13427a36'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5c33499f288c298c3db8dfc7725448db13427a36</id>
<content type='text'>
If the target directory itself is unreadable by untrusted users,
then its contents can't be read[*] by them regardless of their
permissions.  If the target directory _is_ readable, then _it_ will
be rejected if we are forbidding readable objects.  (And if we
aren't we don't care if the contents are readable.)

A similar argument would apply to writable objects within an
unreadable target directory.  We're not making that argument, since
such contents are likelier to be a mistake.

[*] Unless they're hard-linked; see comments in "Limitations"
section.
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
