mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/atom?h=arti-v1.4.2 2025-03-26T15:27:09Z 2025-03-26T15:27:09Z yaucp thomas.yau@kape.com 2025-03-26T15:27:09Z urn:sha1:0a4c1e155a926da2c568c92ef9338fc8eefed6c4 2022-08-29T14:40:00Z Alexander Færøy ahf@torproject.org 2022-08-29T14:40:00Z urn:sha1:8668bd7bc9323c369c24d56004c6b405b0745bb4 See: tpo/core/arti#557. 2022-08-29T14:22:57Z Alexander Færøy ahf@torproject.org 2022-08-29T14:22:57Z urn:sha1:d208706280fde565824198da1aafb8f686c940cd This patch refactors how we construct the `Mistrust` type in the tests found in the fs-mistrust crate such that it is possible to construct an instance of the `Mistrust` type using a set of operations available via the `MistrustBuilder`'s methods. We handle some of the portability issues found while testing this code on Windows in the convenience function `mistrust_build()` instead of having duplicated code in multiple test cases. See: tpo/core/arti#557. 2022-08-29T13:29:25Z Alexander Færøy ahf@torproject.org 2022-08-29T13:29:25Z urn:sha1:514aaf41b8a402c3f05d8d0bb6da80a70e034134 This patch adds a comment to the `link_rel()` function in fs-mistrust to explain why we ignore symlink creation on the Windows platform. See: tpo/core/arti#557. 2022-08-26T19:32:12Z Alexander Færøy ahf@torproject.org 2022-08-26T19:32:12Z urn:sha1:fa1b77642f88c929d6935db2ab6c2936037cdd4f Since we are not going to test symlink creation on Windows we remove this code from the testing module. See: tpo/core/arti#557. 2022-05-03T14:03:32Z Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org 2022-04-13T15:32:23Z urn:sha1:c4a5a49b55ef367afd45ca5855591e28e5f227f4 This crate is meant to solve #315 by giving a way to make sure that a file or directory is only accessible by trusted users. I've tried to explain carefully (in comments and documentation) what this crate is doing and why, under the assumption that it will someday be read by another person like me who does _not_ live and breathe unix file permissions. The crate is still missing some key features, noted in the TODO section. It differs from the first version of the crate by taking a more principled approach to directory checking: it emulates the path lookup process (reading symlinks and all) one path change at a time, thus ensuring that we check every directory which could enable an untrusted user to get to our target file, _or_ which could enable them to get to any symlink that would get them to the target file. The API is also slightly different: It separates the `Mistrust` object (where you configure what you do or do not trust) from the `Verifier` (where you set up a check that you want to perform on a single object). Verifiers are set up to be a bit ephemeral, so that it is hard to accidentally declare that _every_ object is meant to be readable when you only mean that _some_ objects may be readable.