mirrors/arti.git/crates/fs-mistrust/src/imp.rs, branch arti-1.2.1 mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti http://git.dilluti0n.com/mirrors/arti.git/atom?h=arti-1.2.1 2022-08-08T20:32:07Z fix fs-misstrust on android 2022-08-08T20:32:07Z trinity-1686a trinity@deuxfleurs.fr 2022-08-08T20:32:07Z urn:sha1:3cb5d27fb7970b391588c17da4277a5abdb79c64 it would fail to link at runtime due to missing getgrnam_r in bionic and then it would fail again because some directory is group writeable fix runtime issues on ios 2022-07-30T13:42:37Z trinity-1686a trinity@deuxfleurs.fr 2022-07-30T13:17:16Z urn:sha1:19a71534ec6f3f43462c197c9bb964e03356bded remove dependancy 'users' on iOS 2022-07-30T09:28:03Z trinity-1686a trinity@deuxfleurs.fr 2022-07-30T09:28:03Z urn:sha1:68ad22a9852b242e6b87e21bdb51b538fbcd81bc fs-mistrust: API to disable based on environment 2022-07-19T19:21:09Z Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org 2022-07-15T16:08:13Z urn:sha1:03b5efbd6e83d9e6c97f7b46507b1ad925566859 By default we look at `$FS_MISTRUST_DISABLE_PERMISSIONS_CHECKS`. Optionally, the user can provide another variable as well, or disable looking at the environment entirely. fs-mistrust: Improve BadPermission string 2022-05-31T18:23:01Z Alex Xu (Hello71) alex_y_xu@yahoo.ca 2022-05-30T18:18:20Z urn:sha1:bc6b02045ee4e5515f0f057998ef257638bffaf4 To me, "Incorrect permissions on file or directory /path: g=w o=w" implies that the current permissions on /path are 022. Change the message to "Incorrect permissions: /path is u=rwx,g=rwx,o=rwx; need g-w,o-w", which is closer to chmod syntax and is more useful in non-interactive environments such as CI and support. fs-mistrust: allow symlinks to have any permissions 2022-05-25T14:27:45Z Alex Xu (Hello71) alex_y_xu@yahoo.ca 2022-05-24T20:17:45Z urn:sha1:85b4b5620d294b27cdee01989d4f2a936f6f32f4 fs-mistrust: rename fields 2022-05-24T14:54:02Z Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org 2022-05-18T15:52:17Z urn:sha1:baa58daace392eee68f8ff82841631e9114c9918 This renaming will make things slightly simpler for declaring a builder. Loosen checking for readable files within target directories. 2022-05-09T18:40:29Z Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org 2022-05-09T16:01:08Z urn:sha1:5c33499f288c298c3db8dfc7725448db13427a36 If the target directory itself is unreadable by untrusted users, then its contents can't be read[*] by them regardless of their permissions. If the target directory _is_ readable, then _it_ will be rejected if we are forbidding readable objects. (And if we aren't we don't care if the contents are readable.) A similar argument would apply to writable objects within an unreadable target directory. We're not making that argument, since such contents are likelier to be a mistake. [*] Unless they're hard-linked; see comments in "Limitations" section. fs-mistrust: write a lot about TOCTOU issues. 2022-05-03T14:03:32Z Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org 2022-05-03T13:56:23Z urn:sha1:f35b4881295f52c252236b151764e82dbcb3b332 fs-mistrust: Add a dangerously_trust_everyone method. 2022-05-03T14:03:32Z Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org 2022-05-02T15:35:15Z urn:sha1:2087dde3a07a8d31c0625c2d36311e876c07a758 This helps make it possible to use `SecureDir` (name pending) even when we want to disable permissions checks. Otherwise, optional permission checking would require users of this crate to maintain separate code paths for the "check" and "don't check" cases.